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SUMMARY Artificial Intelligence (AI), Big Data, and Cloud Computing (ABC) 
have generated unprecedented opportunities and challenges for economic com-
petitiveness, national security, and law and order, as well as the future of work. 
ABC policies and practices have become contentious issues in U.S.-China bilat-
eral relations. Pundits see a U.S.-China AI race and are already debating which 
country will win. Kaifu Lee, the CEO of Sinovation Ventures, believes that 
China will exceed the United States in AI in about five years.1 Others argue 
that China will never catch up.2 This essay focuses on two issues: the compara-
tive ABC strengths of the United States and China in data and research and 
development (R&D); and the emerging ABC policies and practices in the two 
nations. Empirical analysis suggests that the United States and China lead in 
different areas. Compared to China’s top-down, whole-of-government, national- 
strategy approach, the U.S. ABC policy has been less articulated but is evolving. 
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A U.S.-China ABC Duopoly: Data and R&D
Data: Quantity, Quality, and Purposes. China 
had over 800 million internet users as of 2018, 
more than the European Union (EU)  and the 
United States combined. Thanks to the size of its 
growing middle class and the rapid diffusion of 
the mobile internet, China’s digital economy is 
second only to that of the United States. China 
has become the global leader in e-commerce, 
mobile payments, and gaming. However, the eco-
nomic and social value of big data depends not 
only on volume but also on variety and veracity. 
Data quality may constrain the value of Chinese 
big data. In addition, problematic data practices 
and weak privacy protection could hinder the 
globalization of Chinese tech firms. Not surpris-
ingly, Jim Breyer, a renowned venture capitalist 
famous for his early investment in Facebook, 
claimed that “United States companies simply 
have better data, they understand how to ana-
lyze that data, and if we’re thinking about big 
breakthroughs… the U.S. companies have, cur-
rently, a very significant lead versus the Chinese 
companies.”3 Moreover, how data are collected, 
curated, and used for commercial or coercive 
purposes is shaped by and is shaping ABC poli-
cies and practices in China and the United States 
both independently and interdependently.
 
Research and Development (R&D). The quan-
tity and quality of AI research papers published 
by Chinese scientists have been on the rise. An 
example widely used to demonstrate China’s AI 
power is the decision by the Association for the 
Advancement of AI to postpone its 2017 annual 
conference to accommodate the Chinese New 
Year. Nonetheless, originality remains an area for 
improvement for scientists in China. The United 
States commands a visible lead in AI talent, 
which grows bigger as talent levels increase. A 
report suggested that China’s share in the World 
China’s digital 
economy is second 
only to that of the 
United States
Top 1,000 computer scientists was only 0.5 per-
cent of that of the United States in 2018.4 
Emerging Patterns of ABC Policies and 
Practices
While the broad policy goals of using ABC for 
economic growth and national security may be 
similar in the United States and China, there 
are notable differences in how ABC policy pri-
orities are developed and executed (Figure 1). 
The Chinese approach emphasizes a balance of 
economic development and political stability, a 
strategy that has led to the state’s growing per-
sistence in cyber-sovereignty as well as to policy 
changes regulating state-corporate dynamics. The 
U.S. emphasis on national security, in turn, has 
led to a growing confrontation with China. ABC 
policies and practices are evolving rapidly as poli-
cymakers in both countries adjust bilateral rela-
tions, inter-agency coordination, and relations 
with domestic and international tech giants.
China. In addition to market size and the invest-
ment frenzy from the private sector, Chinese gov-
ernment policies (and the deliberate lack thereof) 
have also been widely credited as a main driver of 
Figure 1. U.S.-China ABC Policy Mission
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China’s digital transformation. At least on paper, 
few countries have a digital policy framework as 
articulate and systematic as the Chinese. Overall, 
China’s ABC policies center on the dual goals 
of political stability and economic development.5 
By taking this approach, the Chinese govern-
ment has been playing multiple roles as regulator, 
investor, and buyer, simultaneously promoting 
cyber-sovereignty through regulating cross-border 
data flow and developing a new mode of control 
and cooption of domestic and foreign firms. 
First, a series of regulatory and legislative 
work ranging from national to regional and local 
policies, laws, plans, and programs has been 
designed and deployed in a top-down, whole-of-
government approach. Among U.S. lawmakers 
and policymakers, the Made in China 2025 Plan 
has attracted the most attention, becoming known 
as “the central villain, the real existential threat 
to U.S. technological leadership.”6 However, that 
ambitious national plan is just one of several 
the Chinese government hopes will transform 
the country into a global hi-tech powerhouse. 
President Xi set the tone when inspecting 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences in July 2013 
by  proclaiming that those who control data con-
trol power [“谁掌握了数据谁就掌握了主动”]. 
In March 2017, the subject of AI entered the 
Chinese Prime Minister’s annual report on the 
Work of the Government and was designated as a 
national strategy. In July 2017, the State Council 
released the New Generation AI Development 
Plan. As Eric Schmidt, then executive chairman 
of Alphabet/Google, said to a Pentagon audience 
about the plan: “By 2020 the Chinese will have 
caught up. By 2025 they will be better than us. 
And by 2030 they will dominate the industries 
of AI.”7 In his keynote speech at the 19th Party 
Congress in October 2017, President Xi reiter-
ated the country’s commitment to the integration 
of the digital economy—including the Internet, 
big data, and AI—with the brick-and-mortar 
economy. In December 2017, while chairing the 
2nd group study of the politburo, China’s power 
center, President Xi reinforced the call to build 
a digital China by pushing the national big data 
strategy for economic and social development.
Second, after quickly gaining financial and 
institutional support from the pertinent minis-
tries of the central government and various levels 
of local government, these policies have led to 
the rapid development of national big data pilot 
zones and research labs as well as ministerial, pro-
vincial, and municipal big data or AI demonstra-
tion bases and parks. For example, following the 
National Big Data Development Plan promul-
gated in 2015, most Chinese provinces released 
provincial big data industry development plans 
or development initiatives by 2016. In 2018, the 
central government set the new goals of estab-
lishing between 10 and 15 big data comprehensive 
pilot zones and a new batch of big data industry 
clusters and demonstration bases by 2020. 
Most notably, Guizhou, one of China’s 
poorest provinces, was selected as China’s first 
national big data pilot zone. While Guizhou’s 
geographic and climatic conditions are prom-
ising for building data centers, President Xi’s 
trust in local allies—especially Mr. Chen Min’er 
and Mr. Chen Gang—was another important 
factor. Inspecting Guizhou National Big Data 
Zone in 2015, President Xi was convinced that “it 
is indeed reasonable for Guizhou to develop big 
data” [“贵州发展大数据确实有道理”]. Because 
of big data development, Guizhou achieved one 
of the highest annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth rates in the nation, and both 
Chens have received fast-track promotions, set-
ting an example for other provinces to imitate. 
The hand of the state is visible in developing 
and financing policy initiatives. Accustomed 
to encouraging digital entrepreneurship 
Because of 
big data 
development, 
Guizhou, one of 
China's poorest 
provinces, 
achieved one 
of the highest 
annual GDP 
growth rates 
in the nation
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through providing land and setting up incu-
bators, governments at different levels have 
been increasingly acting as venture capital-
ists. For instance,capitalists, while Chinese sov-
ereign wealth funds have invested in leading 
Chinese tech unicorns. At the local level, for 
example, Shenzhen Capital Group (SCGC), 
founded by the Shenzhen municipal govern-
ment, is China’s leading domestic venture 
capital firm, with a digital portfolio ranging 
from smart city infrastructure to consumer 
goods in virtual and augmented reality. 
Third, the Chinese government has been 
exploring new modes of control over estab-
lished and emerging tech giants.8 China's dig-
ital economy has primarily developed through 
grassroots entrepreneurs outside of the state-
owned sector. The most prominent example is 
BAT: Baidu, a Chinese search engine; Alibaba, 
an e-commerce firm; and Tencent, a Chinese 
social media platform and the world's largest 
game company. Benefiting from the withdrawal 
of Google as well as the blocking of Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter, the BAT companies domi-
nate the consumer market. In the past several 
years, the Chinese tech ecosystem has become 
one of most vibrant in the world, including 
not just global tech giants such as BAT but 
also their fast-growing junior peers, including 
Didichuxing, Bytedance, SenseTime, IflyTech, 
and Cloudwalk. Each member of BAT has 
been selected as a national champion of AI.9 
The government has used the carrots and 
sticks of government procurements and regula-
tions to bring domestic tech firms into the fold. 
China’s three big state-owned telecoms—China 
Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile—
remain a formidable presence in the big data 
industry. Together with IT equipment manu-
facturers such as Huawei, ZTE, Xiaomi, Inspur, 
and Jingdongfang, they dominate the Chinese 
digital infrastructure. A mixed-ownership reform 
of state-owned telecom behemoths began in 2017, 
welcoming BAT investment and board mem-
bership for greater integration of public- and 
private-sector digital resources. The govern-
ment also floated the idea of taking a 1 percent 
government stake in exchange for board rep-
resentation in Alibaba and Tencent. A Tencent 
executive told the Wall Street Journal that “this 
is the thing that keeps Pony [Ma the founder 
of Tencent] up at night.”10 Another proposal 
raised during China’s parliamentary sessions in 
2018 invited Chinese tech firms listed in over-
seas stock markets to return to the Chinese stock 
market. One after another, Chinese tech tycoons 
expressed their support for a speedy homecoming. 
Implementation has since stalled, however, due 
to volatile Chinese stock market performance. 
Fourth, China has been promoting cyber-
sovereignty through the control of cross-border 
data flow and the demand for data localization. 
Both domestic and foreign companies are required 
to store data from China within China’s borders. 
Additionally, China has been accused of forced 
technology transfer, censorship, and intimida-
tion against American tech firms. Transnational 
corporations have been both complying—via 
forming joint ventures with local, often state-
owned partners—and complaining at the same 
time. To build a data center in Guizhou, Apple 
joined with Cloud Guizhou, a state-owned firm 
with financial backing from the provincial gov-
ernment. Amazon built its major data center 
in Ningxia, a Northwestern province, together 
with Western Cloud Base, whose founder has 
deep government relationships. As evident in 
recent U.S.-China trade negotiations, American 
businesses have shown their concern by lob-
bying the U.S. government to pressure China 
for greater and more open market access.
The United States. The Trump administration’s 
first National Security Strategy described “U.S. 
China's digital 
economy has 
primarily 
developed through 
grassroots 
entrepreneurs 
outside of the 
state-owned sector
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The Trump 
administration’s 
ABC approach 
has centered 
on national 
security and 
added economic 
security as an 
integral part of 
national security
efforts to counter the exploitation of informa-
tion by rivals” as “tepid and fragmented,” lacking 
“a sustained focus,” and “hampered by the lack 
of properly trained professionals.”11 This assess-
ment may be applicable to the U.S. govern-
ment’s ABC policies and efforts. In May 2018, 
the Trump administration released a fact sheet 
highlighting its AI efforts and achievements in 
terms of military and unclassified R&D invest-
ment, government service, regulatory barrier 
removal, talent training, and international col-
laboration.12 Yet, compared to China, America’s 
ABC policy has been less articulate and less 
systematic. While acknowledging the impor-
tance of ABC to national security and govern-
ment efficiency, the federal government has 
been facing challenges such as aging IT infra-
structure, a shortage of IT talent, and tight 
budgets.13 The government shutdown from 
December 2018 to January 2019 may further 
reduce the appeal of federal jobs for ABC talent. 
First, the Trump administration’s ABC 
approach has centered on national security and 
added economic security as an integral part 
of national security. The National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 
gave the Pentagon $716 billion, its largest-ever 
budget.14 The Department of Defense (DoD) 
spent $7.4 billion in 2017 on ABC, setting AI 
as the cornerstone of America’s military domi-
nance.15 Launched in 2017, the Electronics 
Resurgence Initiative of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency is a five-year program 
with a budget of $1.5 billion for chip design, 
architecture, materials, and integration. The 
Army Futures Command, with a budget of $100 
million and a staff of 500, is seeking collabora-
tion with universities to develop next-generation 
technologies for defense.16 The DoD has launched 
Project Maven, aimed at integrating big data and 
machine learning for AI support on the battle-
field within 2–3 years. The DoD’s Joint Enterprise 
Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) acquisition, valued 
at $10 billion over a decade, has created com-
petition between Amazon and other tech firms 
such as Oracle, IBM, Microsoft, and Google. 
Second, compared to past administrations, the 
Trump administration has been more confron-
tational with China, having accused it of forced 
technology transfer and intellectual property theft. 
It has also demanded that the Chinese government 
give up its Made in China 2025 Plan—some-
thing that the Chinese government and public 
have rejected, labeling it as an imperialistic intru-
sion in a sovereign state’s right of development. 
The U.S. inter-agency Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has been 
increasing its scrutiny of Chinese investment in 
critical U.S. infrastructure and technology. The 
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization 
Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) was overwhelmingly 
approved in 2017 by the House and later incor-
porated into the NDAA for fiscal year 2019. The 
act further tightens U.S. national security reviews 
of American exports and bars federal govern-
ment and its contractors from purchasing or 
using technologies from the Chinese firms ZTE 
or Huawei. After being blocked from acquiring 
MoneyGram by CFIUS in 2018, Alibaba has redi-
rected its global cloud computing expansion to 
international markets outside of the United States. 
Huawei, the largest telecommunication equipment 
firm in the world, experienced major setbacks in 
the U.S. market in 2018, starting from AT&T’s 
withdrawal from a deal for distributing Huawei 
smartphones in January and ending with the 
arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer in Canada 
at the request of the United States in December. 
Following both the Department of Justice’s indict-
ment for alleged trade secret theft and fraud and 
the State Department’s warning to European 
allies against using Huawei telecommunications 
equipment for 5G rollouts in early 2019, the 
Trump administration issued an executive order 
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banning Huawei from operating in the United 
States. The Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
also added Huawei to its Entity List in May.17 
Third, the Trump administration has been 
developing greater inter-agency coordination and 
public and private collaboration. Since President 
Trump took office, the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) experienced a decline 
in terms of size and expertise.18 Because the posi-
tions of both the U.S. Chief Technology Officer 
(CTO) and the director of OSTP were not filled 
for a long time, Michael Kratsios, the Deputy 
U.S. CTO and Deputy Assistant to the President 
at OSTP, has served as the government’s de facto 
top tech official. In coordination with federal 
agencies, he has played a critical role since early 
2017 in shaping national policies and the overall 
agenda on big data, innovation, and technology 
infrastructure. Mr. Kratsios was finally nomi-
nated and confirmed as the Chief Technology 
Officer of the United States in August 2019. 
Meanwhile, the White House Office of 
American Innovation was set up by a presidential 
order, with Jared Kushner appointed its director 
in March 2017. Its mission is to “make recom-
mendations to the President on policies and plans 
that improve Government operations and ser-
vices, improve the quality of life for Americans 
now and in the future, and spur job creation.”19 
Since then, the Office of American Innovation has 
served as the White House’s main point of con-
tact for the American tech industry and played an 
important role in introducing the Modernizing 
Government Technology (MGT) Act in December 
2017. In May 2018, the OSTP helped convene 
an AI summit of top executives from Amazon, 
Facebook, Google, Intel, and thirty-four other 
major U.S. companies for policy proposals on 
the development of robots, algorithms, and AI, 
and Mr. Kushner gave the closing remarks. Soon 
after, an interagency select committee was cre-
ated as a subgroup within the National Science 
and Technology Council, with a mandate to 
“advise the White House on government-wide 
AI research and development priorities; estab-
lish partnerships between government, the pri-
vate sector and independent researchers, and [to 
develop] policies to prioritize AI research, better 
leverage federal data and computing resources 
for the AI research community, and train the 
next generation of American AI researchers.”20 
In February 2019, President Trump launched 
the American AI Initiative, which “will focus the 
resources of the Federal government to develop 
AI in order to increase our Nation’s prosperity, 
enhance our national and economic security, 
and improve quality of life for the American 
people.” Using a multipronged approach, the 
American AI Initiative has five key areas of 
emphasis: (1) investing in R&D; (2) making fed-
eral data and computing resources more available 
to research institutes and industries; (3) setting 
AI governance standards and providing guid-
ance to assure public trust; (4) preparing the 
AI workforce; and (5) promoting international 
engagement and protecting “the advantage of 
the United States in AI and technology critical 
to United States national and economic security 
interests against strategic competitors and for-
eign adversaries.”21 The United States is the 19th 
country in the world to release such a national 
AI policy, plan, or initiative.22 The initiative was 
welcomed, but critics have pointed out the need 
to flesh out specific actions and commitments. 
Policy Pitfalls and Recommendations 
It is uncertain how much the ongoing U.S.-China 
trade negotiations will diffuse tensions. What 
is clear, however, is that how China develops 
its digital economy will not undergo signifi-
cant structural changes overnight. While China 
The United States 
is the 19th country 
in the world to 
release a national 
AI policy, plan, 
or initiative
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may give up the Made-in-China 2025 Plan, it 
is unlikely to give up the pursuit of the Chinese 
dream, of which ABC technologies are an inte-
gral part. What we may be seeing instead is the 
prologue of U.S.-China ABC competition. 
China. Digital technologies in China reflect 
the contradictions and complexities of Chinese 
society: growing Internet access but a persistent 
digital divide; significant economic development 
but tightening political control; and new forms of 
civic engagement but pervasive surveillance.23 The 
Chinese government has identified the capacity 
of concentrating resources to accomplish big 
projects [集中力量办大事] as its greatest insti-
tutional advantage. Even some in Washington 
have expressed admiration for the power of the 
Chinese government to quickly set priorities 
and move forward. However, with such capacity 
comes risks such as overinvestment, overcapacity, 
and a huge waste of resources as officials and 
entrepreneurs swarm to the next big thing the 
government picks. The meteoric boom and bust 
of the Chinese bike-sharing business, with the 
mountains of abandoned shared bikes and bil-
lions of investments lost, may serve as the latest 
case in hand. Driven by government officials’ 
push for GDP growth, an AI “heat wave” has 
reached county level and generated ghost parks 
that lack talent or expertise. Fake AI firms and 
projects have frustrated investors. High R&D 
investment, high competition from established 
firms such as BAT, and high user acquisition 
costs mean that the survival of most AI firms is 
a longshot, especially due to the slow develop-
ment of the consumer (2C) and the business (2B) 
market. Not surprisingly, many Chinese AI firms 
tap the so-called 2G market where the govern-
ment serves as the main client of ABC products 
and services. For instance, Megvii’s product 
Face++, a facial recognition service, has been 
used by Chinese police forces across the country.
The United States. Observers may have dif-
ferent assessments of the Trump Administration’s 
confrontational approach to China. While the 
specifics of ongoing trade negotiation between 
the United States and China remain uncertain, 
stronger intellectual-property protection, more 
transparent technology transfer, and greater 
market access would allow American firms to 
compete more effectively in the Chinese market. 
However, it is at least as critical for the federal 
government to develop a long-term, more com-
prehensive tech policy framework that enables 
greater investment in R&D. Indeed, a National 
Science Foundation analysis suggests that while 
R&D investment increased by about 4 percent 
annually during 2010–2015, China accelerated 
its R&D investment at an annual growth rate 
of 18 percent over the same time period.24 Erica 
Fuchs, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, 
points out that “the U.S. government’s overall 
approach to supporting electronics innovation 
is ‘easily an order of magnitude below’ what's 
needed to address the challenges we're facing.”25
Moving Forward. Washington has to care-
fully gauge the costs and benefits of countering, 
containing, or engaging China as a strategic 
competitor, while Beijing needs to be simi-
larly cautious about mobilizing their political 
base through nationalism. It is important to 
leaders in both countries to go beyond conven-
tional wisdom as they prepare for a long-term 
U.S.-China technology competition that will 
profoundly impact not just the two nations 
but the rest of the world as well. How each 
side acts will have a huge influence on the 
ABC policies and practices of the other side. 
While U.S. 
R&D investment 
increased by 
about 4 percent 
annually 
during 2010–
2015, China's 
accelerated at an 
annual growth 
rate of 18 percent 
over the same 
time period
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